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After a concerted and well-publicized campaign to legitimize the necessity of inoculating all United 
States (US) military forces against anthrax, the US Secretary of Defense has decided to change the 
policy. The US will now inoculate only those forces most at risk to weaponized anthrax--primarily those 
forces in South Korea and Kuwait. The rationale for the change is that the US supply of vaccine is running 
out. 
 
This denouement joins a host of problems with the original policy of mass inoculation. First, the 
biological warfare threat could easily be changed to another agent, even another variant of anthrax. 
Second, the incidence and prevalence of inoculation side effects through time has not been well-
researched. Third, legitimate concerns with the first two points by capable military personnel led to 
some of them refusing to receive the inoculations and then being forced out of the military. And now US 
resolve to see a policy carried out has been derailed by a vaccine shortage--resulting from a 
manufacture shutdown at the only plant making the vaccine due to violations of safety, consistency, 
record-keeping, and sterility. Furthermore, a former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an unpaid 
board member of the corporation that owns the plant and may have an 11% interest in that 
corporation--raising (however, unwarranted) suspicions of special interests and dispensations. 
 
It is quite probable that the inoculation program was significantly intended to signal US determination to 
confront current and future foes. This example of biopolitics, however, seems to have done the 
opposite. (See Anthrax vaccinations: Saddam wins again. (May 1, 1998). IBPP, 4(17); Derakhshan, F., & 
Fatehi, K. (1985). Bureaucracy as a leadership substitute: A review of history. Leadership and 
Organization Development Journal, 6, 13-16; Elliott, A. (1995). Symptoms of globalization: or, Mapping 
reflexivity in the postmodern age. Political Psychology, 16, 719-736; Klugman, J. (1986). The psychology 
of Soviet corruption, indiscipline, and resistance to reform. Political Psychology, 7, 67-82; Sciolino, E. 
(July 11, 2000). Shortage forces pentagon to cut anthrax inoculations. The New York Times, p. A14; 
Williams, N. M., Sjoberg, G., & Sjoberg, A. F. The bureaucratic personality: An alternate view. Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 16, 389-405.) (Keywords: Anthrax, Biopolitics, Mass Inoculation, Military.) 
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